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Abstract Has the time come to put to bed the concept of a harm threshold when
discussing the ethics of reproductive decision making and the legal limits that
should be placed upon it? In this commentary, we defend the claim that there exist
good moral reasons, despite the conclusions of the non-identity problem, based on
the interests of those we might create, to refrain from bringing to birth individuals
whose lives are often described in the philosophical literature as ‘less than worth
living’.
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Introduction
Has the time come to put to bed the concept of a harm threshold when discussing the
ethics of reproductive decision making and the legal limits that should be placed
upon it? This is the question asked by Anna Smajdor in her article in this issue. For
her, the answer is a resounding yes. She claims—after outlining the concept of the
harm threshold in reproductive decision making, noting its many proponents in the
philosophical community, and observing its inclusion in legal and policy documents
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related to reproduction—that no entity can be harmed by being brought into
existence, regardless of the extent to which they will suffer once born.
Smajdor comes to this conclusion by appealing to a well-known literature that
supports the notion that the act of creation cannot be identical with the acts of
harming and benefiting. For if, in accordance with this literature, she suggests,
existence should not be considered to be a ‘real’ predicate—that is, if existence
cannot be considered an attribute of an object and thus fails to add to the concept of
a thing—no entity can be harmed or benefited by being born. In short, her argument
is based on the following simple claim: there does not exist a ‘logical connection
between the assertion that some lives are not worth living, and the claim that such
people are harmed by being conceived’ [1]. Thus, her article, although she does not
choose to characterize it in this way, actually constitutes the suggestion that those
who subscribe to a harm based and person affecting account of morality (or of the
limits of law) must acknowledge that, in holding this view, they are also required1 to
accept the conclusions of a remarkably strong version of a problem in philosophy,
known as the ‘non-identity problem’.
In this commentary, we defend the claim that despite the conclusions of the non-
identity problem, there are good moral reasons, based upon consideration of the suffering
that would be experienced by the individual concerned, not to decide to bring him or her
to birth. We have in mind cases in which a foetus or embryo is likely to become an
individual whose life is variously described in the philosophical literature as ‘empty of all
the things that make life worth living’ [2], ‘dominated by pain and suffering’ [3],
‘intractably miserable’ [4], ‘not worth living’ [5], or ‘worse than no life at all’ [6].
Our arguments are, however, more than mere commentary. We aim to settle
some tenacious misunderstandings of the logic of this corner of moral discourse by
exploring and explaining the difference between the use of comparative and non-
comparative accounts of harm in non-identity cases and the problems that occur
when such accounts are conflated. We thus begin our commentary by providing a
reconstruction of the major components of the arguments contained within
Smajdor’s article. We then question whether Smajdor’s use of Derek Parfit’s
arguments in her own is a charitable one that truly captures the spirit in which they
were made. After this, we note that although a threshold account of prenatal harm
may not be compatible with comparative accounts of harm, the logical inconsis-
tencies Smajdor associates with this account do not occur on non-comparative
accounts of harm, such as the one championed by one of us, John Harris, in his book
Wonderwoman and Superman.
Doing away with the harm threshold: reconstructing, summarising, explaining,
and situating Smajdor’s position in relation to our own
Smajdor begins her attack on the harm threshold in reproductive decision making by
noting the benefits that are often associated with harm-based, person-affecting
1 Provided they accept some version of the claim that our existence is dependent on our being conceived
from the gametes from which we are actually conceived.
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accounts of morality and the proper limits of legislation. She notes, for example,
that although she does not subscribe to the belief ‘that harm to offspring is the sole
focus of moral concern in reproductive decisions’ [1], there is something to be said
for a harm-based approach to legislation and morality. This can be found, she
suggests, in the fact that a focus on the harms our choices may impose on others are
more identifiable and less subjective than a focus on deontological principles or
impersonal and free-floating harms. She thus suggests that because of this more
empirical focus, harm based approaches ‘may be a useful interface between
morality and legislation’ [1]. She then observes, however—in recognising the
conclusions of the non-identity problem, as have many before her, including
ourselves (see, for example, [7, 8])—that this approach seems to offer very few of
the benefits it provides in cases of harms to extant persons in the context of
reproduction.
This is so because if we limit moral and legal criticism only to those acts which
can be said to negatively affect the interests of some particular entity, it turns out
that our reproductive decisions will, in many cases, have little or no moral content,
despite our intuitions to the contrary. That is, if we also accept the relatively
uncontroversial proposition that our coming into existence is highly precarious—
‘dependent on the conditions under which we and our descendants procreate, with
the slightest difference in the conditions of conception sufficient, in a particular
case, to [ensure] the creation of a different future person’ [9].
There are a number of versions of what might be called ‘the precariousness
proposition’, which produce slight differences in the kinds of circumstances in
which non-identity cases are generated. This is so as the particular version to which
one subscribes depends greatly on one’s views concerning what it is that makes one
numerical person the same numerical person over time and change. However, the
version to which Smajdor appeals in her article seems to be based on an acceptance
of the precariousness proposition as it is formulated in the work of Parfit in his two
versions of the ‘time dependence claim’ (TDC). As she does not make it clear to
which version she subscribes—and this actually makes little difference in the cases
she considers—we will assume her allegiance is to the slightly weaker form, which,
as Parfit notes, is in fact true, although not necessarily so:
TDC 2: ‘If any particular person had not been conceived within a month of the
time when he was in fact conceived, he would in fact never have existed’. [10,
p. 352]
This version of the precariousness proposition may be interpreted in three
different ways. It can be seen, firstly, as a causal claim regarding the importance of
our genome for the development of personal identity (understood as psychological
connectedness and continuity) by noting, for example, that ‘differences in [genetic]
material make for later differences in virtually all aspects of a person: change the
sperm, and there will be substantial changes (of both a physical and psychological
kind) in the later human being’ [11]. Secondly, it can be viewed as a weak version
of Kripke’s origins claim regarding the importance of our material origins for
numerical identity on biological accounts of personal identity over time. This
interpretation suggests that just as all material things must have their origin in at
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least some of the matter from which they are constituted, so too must all numerical
persons have their origins in, inter alia, the genetic material from which they are
constituted in order to be considered the same numerical entity [8]. Thirdly,
however, one might view it as a temporal or environmental claim regarding the
importance of possible epigenetic factors and others flowing from the time, place,
and manner of our conception. Time, place, and manner may thus embrace factors
such as differences in the method of conception, gestational environment, maternal
nutrition, the general external environment, and exposure to potentially teratogenic
substances during pregnancy.
Depending on one’s interpretation, it can therefore be noted that non-identity is
not simply related to conception and factors tied to the timing of conception, nor, as
the Parfit of Reasons and Persons perhaps believed, simply to genetic identity [8,
11, 12]. However, Smajdor’s interpretation of the claim does seem to fall into either
the causal or Kripkean camp, as she notes numerous times in her article, the
importance for personal identity of our being conceived from the particular egg or
sperm from which we were conceived. This means that, whilst non-identity may not
occur in cases of straightforward prenatal harm, such as when a pregnant woman
ingests a teratogen or a foetus is injured in some other way during pregnancy, it will
be commonplace in cases of genetic decisions regarding, for example, with whom
we choose to procreate and when we wish to do so. For this understanding of the
TDC2, when paired with a person affecting account of morality that rests on a
comparative account of harm, yields a particular prescription. This is that many
reproductive decisions turn out to affect not the interests of persons created as a
result of such decisions but their identities, and thus cause no harm to those created
as a result.
Indeed, the trap of non-identity is not only evidenced in cases of seemingly
harmful conceptions. Many people at the time of World War II, for example,
including the parents of one of the present authors, decided to await the result of the
war and the defeat of Nazism before conceiving or conceiving again. Such people
believed they were somehow acting in the interests of the child that would be born
to them, despite the fact that they seemed to be ‘guilty’ of falling into the trap of
non-identity. It should be noted too that non-identity poses an ‘intriguing theoretical
obstacle’ [13] to questions of intergenerational justice and, as has been most
recently noted, to cases of affirmative action and of apology or reparation for
historic injustices. For, ironically, were it not for the wrong that was done to the
ancestors of those now seeking apology or compensation, the latter would almost
certainly never have existed [14].
Smajdor illustrates this point in the reproductive case by providing an example of
a woman who is receiving treatment for syphilis and must make a choice between
conceiving now and giving birth to a child with congenital syphilis, or waiting until
after she has been cured and giving birth to a ‘healthy’ child (free from congenital
syphilis). Like Parfit, Smajdor suggests that despite many people’s intuitions to the
contrary, the woman has little reason based on the interests of the children she
would create to choose to wait. For, whilst many of us tend to believe that it is better
to be born without a disability than with one, as disability is, by definition,
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disadvantageous, person-affecting morality actually gives us little reason based on
the interests of the child created to wait to conceive.
If one accepts the TDC2 and holds too that our actions only have moral status
when they affect the interests of distinct numerical persons, one can see that
regardless of the decision she makes, her child will not be harmed as different
children will come to exist depending upon her choice. For, whilst it is true that if
she conceives now, her child will be born with congenital syphilis—an undoubtedly
harmful condition which may result in cerebral palsy, hearing loss, and musculo-
skeletal deformities—should she wait to conceive a child free of syphilis, a different
child will be born as ‘a different egg and sperm will be involved, resulting in a
genetically different individual’ [1]. The child the woman could conceive now could
not exist without suffering from congenital syphilis. Being brought into existence
suffering from such a condition cannot harm him. For, whilst he might rationally
prefer a life without his affliction, the alternative for him is not a life without the
effects of congenital syphilis, but no life at all, as syphilis is a condition of his very
existence.
Here, however, is where Smajdor takes her position to depart from Parfit’s. For,
whilst she agrees that in the case of congenital syphilis, the woman would not harm
her child by bringing him into existence with this affliction, non-identity statements
are not always so simple.
For although this is not always the case, such statements often come with a
qualifier that warns against the creation of lives that are ‘empty of all the things that
make life worth living’ [2], ‘dominated by pain and suffering’ [3], ‘intractably
miserable’ [4], ‘not worth living’ [5], ‘worse than no life at all’ [6]. This qualifier
can be found in the works of many authors who write on the non-identity problem.
Smajdor, for example, notes that Robertson suggests that although it is normally the
the case that ‘a child’s interests are hardly protected by preventing that child’s
existence…, this objection would not hold if the … conditions of his life would be
so harmful to him that from his perspective he would prefer not to live’ [15, p. 75].
It is this qualifier with which Smajdor takes issue. For, she holds that its addition
entails a commitment to a questionable view: the view that ‘a child born with a
worse disease than congenital syphilis could have been harmed—if the disease is so
terrible as to mean that she does not have a minimally acceptable quality of life’ [1].
In other words, she claims that to add this qualifying phrase entails a commitment to
the view that conception can constitute a harm to the child in the latter but not the
former case because ‘a threshold has been passed… which was not breached in the
case of the child with congenital syphilis’ [1]. Despite the fact that Smajdor fails to
truly unpack the threshold account of harm as it is said to apply to non-identity
cases, her characterisation of the account is accurate albeit bare. For, those who
subscribe to a threshold account of harm in such cases should be seen to hold that
some procreative choice made at T1 harms a person if and only if it causes into
existence a person who falls below some normatively defined threshold of
wellbeing, interest satisfaction, etc.
For Smajdor, such accounts are deeply problematic as she is sceptical about the
existence of a ‘logical connection between the assertion that some lives are not
worth living, and the claim that such people are harmed by being conceived’ [1].
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After a rather long section in which she notes the seeming arbitrariness of a
threshold account of harm and a number of troubling conclusions associated with
this [1], she provides support for her scepticism by asking the reader to consider
Kant’s refutation of Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God.
In his Proslogion, Anselm claims to derive the existence of God from definition: the
concept of God as ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’ [16]. He held
that if such a definition is true, God must exist in reality, since if He does not, a greater
being can be conceived of: one than which nothing greater can be thought, and which, in
fact, exists. Kant however, argued that Anselm committed a grave error in his argument,
suggesting that although Anselm treats existence as a property that things may either
possess or fail to possess, to say that some entity exists is not to confer existence on it.
Instead, it is to say that the concept of the thing is exemplified in the world, just as to say
that some entity does not exist is not to state that a thing lacks the property of existence
but to say that the concept of that thing is not exemplified in the real world. In other
words, Kant argued that a God that exists is identical to a God that does not. For, whether
something exists or does not exist does not add to or alter the properties it possesses, it is
the mere positing of a thing: ‘a hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more
than a hundred possible thalers’ [17, pp. B626-7] and ‘the real God is not a few degrees
more perfect than a conceptual one’ [1].
With this done, Smajdor suggests that we may straightforwardly apply Kant’s
argument to the act of creation and the question of whether an entity can be harmed by
creation itself. For, she notes, ‘the act of creation can be construed uncontroversially as
the act of bringing something into existence,’ and thus, ‘whatever is logically true of
existence in general should be true of creation insofar as it is the conferring of
existence.… If existence itself cannot entail any other property, then it follows that the
mere act of giving existence cannot encompass the act of conferring any property—
other than existence—on the entity which is created’ [1]. With this in mind, Smajdor
concludes that creating something, or bringing it into existence, cannot be the same as
harming it. For, although harm is not a predicate in the usual sense, the fact of having a
harmful genetic constitution is. It qualifies an entity in the same way as other predicates.
Thus, she suggests that ‘if we cannot make X greater, more perfect, or more valuable by
bringing it into existence, neither can we harm X by bringing it into existence however
greatly X must suffer’ [1]. She therefore concludes:
There is no specific act that can be construed as harming a future child when the
child’s condition is directly linked with the circumstances surrounding its
conception. Nor can these questions be a matter of degree, since the logical and
metaphysical constraints that prevent us from concluding that a child born with a
moderate amount of suffering has been harmed apply equally to all cases of
creation. [1]
Is Smajdor’s characterisation of Parfit’s position fair?
With the major components of Smajdor’s argument explained and laid out above,
we now return to the point at which she takes her position on the possibility of
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harming by the act of creation to differ from Parfit’s. For, we contend that the
characterisation she offers of Parfit’s view on the matter of harms to individuals
with ‘lives that are less than worth living’ is, at best, uncharitable, and at worst,
based on a misunderstanding of the claims made by Parfit on this matter.
The point at which she holds her position to diverge from Parfit’s occurs just after
an acceptance of the conclusions of the non-identity problem in the case of the child
with congenital syphilis. For, as is noted above, she and Parfit agree that in this case
there is little reason for the woman to choose to wait based upon the interests of the
child she creates. Her choice is a choice between lives as opposed to a choice of
whether to harm or benefit her child. However, whilst this is so, Smajdor argues that
Parfit does not discount the possibility that there is a point at which the woman’s
child could be harmed by his conception: the point at which this child’s life would
be less than worth living, dominated by suffering, or where the quantity and quality
of whatever it is that makes life worth living falls below some threshold level, such
that the harms he would suffer throughout his life outweigh its pleasures.
Smajdor, however, denies that this could be the case, holding that even if the
woman’s choice was between a worthwhile and a less than worthwhile life, no harm
would be done to the child created should she choose to bring to birth a child whose
life falls below this threshold level. She characterizes Parfit’s view regarding lives
that are dominated by suffering as follows: ‘that the child could not have existed
without that condition does not prevent us from concluding that [he] has been
harmed. A threshold has been passed in the latter case, which was not breached in
the [former] case’ [1].
She then explores what Parfit might mean by this: asking why Parfit should hold
that in the case of congenital syphilis the child created cannot be harmed by his
mother’s choice, but would be harmed should he suffer more seriously. What, she
asks, is it that makes the suffering of the child bear on questions of the morality of
the mother’s actions in the latter but not the former case? Why does Parfit seem to
divorce the concept of harm from its normal relationship with suffering, turning it
into a mercurial entity that flashes into existence only in certain very specific
circumstances? [1]
After all, Parfit claims, as do many others who accept the conclusions of the non-
identity problem, that non-identity is a logical and metaphysical problem as opposed
to one relating to the degree of suffering an individual must endure before he can be
deemed harmed, all things considered. The mother is—according to its logic—not
morally responsible ‘because there is no causal mechanism by which we can
understand him to be harmed’ [1]. Her blamelessness has nothing to do with the fact
that her child does not suffer enough or because the harms of his existence fail to
outweigh the pleasures his life contains. Her child is not harmed and she may not be
criticized morally because he could not have existed absent his condition and she
could have done nothing to alleviate his suffering without causing some other child
to exist instead of him.
Smajdor thus notes that due to this there is no reason to assume that the
conclusions of the non-identity problem should not apply equally in the more
serious case. The relevant facts are, she contends, the same in both, regardless of the
extent to which the created child suffers once brought into existence. Thus, she
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holds that Parfit and others are guilty of contradicting themselves when they state
that in cases of ‘lives less than worth living’, the child created could be harmed as
they are essentially asserting that despite their logical position, ‘existence cannot
harm someone … [but] it is, after all, a question of degree’ [1].
Yet, whilst Smajdor’s point is well made—the non-identity problem does seem to
apply equally to cases of worthwhile and less than worthwhile lives as the facts
relevant to its generation are the same—at no point within Reasons and Persons
does Parfit suggest that this is not so. He does not claim, despite Smajdor’s
assertion, that the child created in the more serious case can be harmed by the act of
his creation because his life is less than worth living. He leaves this open to
interpretation just as he leaves open to interpretation the question of whether
causing some person to exist can be said to cause them some peculiar benefit. He
does this in virtue of the fact that he views both a negative and positive answer to
the question of whether existence can constitute a predicate as being defensible [10,
p. 358].
It should be noted too, in fairness to Smajdor, that because of this, Parfit does not
make clear that the conclusions of the non-identity problem may still hold in cases
of less than worthwhile lives dependent on the views one holds regarding this. All of
his non-identity cases, for example, regard unquestionably worthwhile lives and
thus say nothing about the conclusions of the non-identity problem in cases of lives
which are less than worth living. Parfit considers, for example, a child whose mother
had him too young but whose life, despite its ‘bad start…, [is] predictably worth
living’ [10, p. 358]; a choice between conserving our resources for future
generations or depleting them such that future generations will live lives of much
lower but still acceptable (although barely so) quality [10, pp. 361-4]; and a woman
who must choose between waiting to conceive or having a child with a painful but
not terrible disability [18]. In other words, although Smajdor asserts that Parfit’s
claim is based on a mistake—the formation of an untenable connection between the
assertion that some lives are not worth living and the claim that such people are
harmed by being conceived—the mistake here seems to be her own. The claim she
attributes to Parfit can, on a close reading, be found nowhere in the work she
references although, as can be seen in appendix G of Reasons and Persons, he is
sympathetic to this view.
Can a child be harmed by his own conception? On comparative and non-
comparative accounts of harm in genesis cases
Smajdor seems to suggest that the only plausible accounts of harming are those that
are comparative in nature. That is, she seems to recognise as proper only accounts of
harming that compare some particular numerical entity’s current state of welfare,
happiness, interest satisfaction, etc. to the state that he would have been in had some
particular action not occurred. Examples of such accounts are that of the diachronic
account, according to which some particular action (or inaction) done at time t1 is
harmful iff it causes some person (p) to be worse off at some later time t2 than they
were at t1, and the subjunctive historical account made famous by Joel Feinberg,
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which suggests that some particular action (or inaction) done at t1 is harmful for p iff
it causes p to be worse off at t2 than he would have been at t2 had it not occurred [5].
Such accounts necessarily exclude the possibility that present persons may harm
future and merely possible persons by acts of creation in cases of both worthwhile
and less than worthwhile lives. This is so because in order to make a harm claim on
comparative accounts, one is required to compare the state of p’s interests, welfare,
happiness, etc. with the state he would have been in had the act not been performed
(subjunctive historical) or was in prior to the performance (diachronic). Thus, as the
alternative in non-identity cases is non-existence and non-existence is no state at all,
there can be no way to make such a comparison. The writing is, on such accounts,
already on the wall as it is nonsensical to discuss a harm threshold when its
existence is precluded by the nature of the account in question.
Yet, that this is so does not preclude the possibility that comparative accounts
may be compatible with the following argument: although a child who will have a
less than worthwhile life may not be harmed by his conception, he may be harmed if
his suffering does not end as soon as it begins (whether before or after birth), and
this may constitute a good reason not to conceive such a child in the first place. This
is not the question addressed by Smajdor in her article, and as such, it has been
understandably glossed over. However, it does seem important. For, it means that on
comparative accounts, although we may not say that a child can be harmed by his
conception even if his life is one that is less than worth living, we can provide good
person-affecting reasons to support a moral requirement to prevent the suffering of a
child whose life will be dominated by suffering.
For, if there exists a moral duty not only to refrain from causing persons to suffer
but also to actively seek to ameliorate suffering where it occurs, we may find that in
cases of lives dominated by suffering, there is a moral duty to end the lives of such
individuals as soon as they come to suffer. We need not claim that the child created
is harmed by his own conception or that those responsible for his conception are to
blame for his poor prospects. He is not and they are not, as nothing could have been
done to avoid this unfortunate stacking of the deck. Yet, whilst the prospective child
may not be harmed by his conception, we may hold that those responsible for his
conception are morally blameworthy for failing to stop his experience of such
severe and uncompensated suffering in the face of full knowledge of his
devastatingly poor life prospects.
Consideration of the nature of different accounts of harm seems to uncover
another major problem inherent in Smajdor’s article. This can be found in the fact
that it is poor philosophical practice to attempt to criticise one account by merely
showing that it is different from another. That such is the case is already transparent.
The utilitarian may not fairly criticise the Kantian by stating only that he is not a
utilitarian. He must instead uncover some fatal flaw in the theory of his foe or appeal
to good reasons suggesting his account is more plausible. With this in mind, we can
note that those who subscribe to comparative accounts of harm cannot refer to the
inadequacy of non-comparative theories by merely noting that they are not the same
as their own. The threshold account is a non-comparative theory. As such, what is
needed on Smajdor’s part is an explanation of why the particular account of harm
she seeks to criticise should be seen to be lacking in some sense, and this can only
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be done via explication or the provision of an explanation of why one’s own account
overcomes such shortcomings by demonstrating both its superiority and its
avoidance of other equally troubling conclusions.
Comparative accounts are, however, not the only plausible accounts of harm to
which one may appeal. To be sure, they are intuitive, since generally, when we think
of harm, we think of things going worse for someone than they otherwise might
have. Yet, despite this, such accounts are not a panacea. They face a number of
problems that are not limited only to the fact that they fail to account for our
intuitions in non-identity cases. Thus, although we might be willing, as Smajdor is,
to bite the bullet in such cases and accept the counterintuitive conclusions
comparative accounts engender in such cases, these are not the only counterintuitive
conclusions such accounts are often argued as entailing. Comparative accounts have
been said, for example, to fail to account for circumstances in which we wish to say
that an individual has been both significantly harmed and greatly benefited by an act
which causes an on-balance benefit, such as in Seana Shiffrin’s example of the
generous but dangerous millionaire who drops large blocks of gold bullion from the
sky as gifts to citizens of a neighbouring town where the million dollar manna ends
up falling on and injuring one of the recipients [19]. They are charged with
multiplying harms excessively due to the fact that, on such accounts, harms are
grounded in comparisons, leading to confusing and questionable determinations. For
when one is harmed, one does not undergo a separate harm relative to each earlier
moment in one’s life at which one fared better [20], as would be the case on the
diachronic comparative account, and neither does one undergo a number of different
harms in cases where one is shot just because one would have been better off had
one’s assailant not pulled the trigger, had the gun not gone off, or had the bullet
missed one’s body, as would be the case on the subjunctive historical account [20].
Comparative accounts, it has been said, fail to account for the harm in beneficial
cases of self-harming, as in the case of the ‘Blighty’ wound [7, p. 92],2 and for pre-
emptive harms [20]. Indeed, whilst this is not the place for a lengthy discussion of
these shortcomings, they are numerous and have been widely discussed within the
literature.
One account of harm often presented as a credible alternative to comparative
accounts, and which seems to overcome a great number of the problems often
associated with them, has been championed by one of the authors of this
commentary, Harris. It is set out in great detail in his book Wonderwoman and
Superman and is often termed the ‘harmed state account’. On this account, and on
other similar accounts of harm such as that proposed by Shiffrin [19], the notions of
harming and wronging set out in comparative accounts of harm seem to be turned
upside down, and a particular numerical entity can be said to be harmed when it is
simply the case that he has been put into a condition that is harmful. As Harris
explains:
2 The term ‘Blighty wound’ is often used to refer to a wound (often self inflicted) sustained by a soldier
during wartime that is serious enough to get him sent home from the battlefield but not so serious as to kill
or reduce his quality of life in any significant way, thus, benefiting him overall.
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A condition that is harmful … is one in which the individual is disabled or
suffering in some way or in which his interests or rights are frustrated. The
disability or suffering may be slight, just as harms are trivial…. I would want
to claim that a harmed condition obtains wherever someone is in a disabling or
hurtful condition, even [if] that condition is only marginally disabling and
even [if] it is not possible for that particular individual to avoid the condition
in question. [7] p. 88]
On this account of harm, therefore:
To suffer harm is to come to be in—or perhaps better, is simply to be in—a
certain sort of non-comparatively bad state. It is to come to be in… a state in
which one fares, not worse than one fared, or would have fared, in some
alternative state of affairs, but simply badly. The seriousness of a given harm,
according to this way of thinking, is proportionate to the (non-comparative)
badness of this state. [20]
Such accounts therefore leave open the possibility of all sorts of harms befalling
future and present individuals even if they cannot be said to have been made worse
off. Quite often, such individuals will, of course, be made worse off, but this is not a
central question. As such, the possibility is left open that individuals can, and quite
often will, be deemed harmed in non-identity cases, because although they would
never have come into existence had the act not been done, in order to determine
harm, one needs only to point to the fact that the individual suffers.
Returning to the congenital syphilis case, then, we note that should the woman
choose to conceive now, she will conceive a child who suffers from the effects of
congenital syphilis, and thus, her child will be born harmed by her action. Despite
the fact that had she made a different choice he would not exist, she is still to be held
responsible for the harm that has occurred as ‘where B is in a condition that is
harmed and A and/or C is responsible for B’s being in that condition, then A and/or
C have harmed B’ [7, p. 89]. Non-identity does, however, still represent a problem
on such accounts if we are unwilling to appeal to impersonal harms and wrongs3 in
cases such as the above, resulting in harmed but still worthwhile lives, but it occurs
for the reason that no wrong can be determined. It remains a problem:
Not because the life in question has not been impaired, not because the
individuals are not suffering, not because they have not been harmed: it has,
they are, and they have: rather because it is not possible to regard them as
having been wronged. You might harm someone in order to benefit them, but
if so, you do not wrong them unless you violate their will in order to do so or
breach some other obligation to them. The mother giving a life with some
measure of disability to a child who will find such a life worth having does not
wrong her child. She is like the doctor giving a drug [that] has damaging side
effects but side effects [that] are worth enduring for the sake of staying alive.
[7, p. 95]
3 Broadly defined as those resulting from the bringing of avoidable suffering into the world.
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In the congenital syphilis case, the child should be seen as harmed by his
mother’s act, but the mother is saved from blameworthiness because her child has a
life that is worth living. He will not be wronged by her because, ‘like those with
Blighty wounds or those who have to endure the harmful side-effects of beneficial
drugs, [he] has received a net benefit from what has happened to [him] and none of
[his] rights have been violated’ [7, pp. 95-6]. It would be irrational for him to
condemn his mother for her choice as he would not have existed without his
condition and his existence is, although not perfectly so, pleasurable.
Yet, returning to the more serious case of the choice to bring to birth a child
whose life will be less than worth living, we note that non-comparative accounts can
state that to make such a choice, in full knowledge of this fact, constitutes both a
harm and a wrong.4 In other words, non-comparative accounts are, unlike
comparative accounts, compatible with a subscription to a harm threshold. This,
of course, requires an answer to the question of what it actually means for an
individual to be in a worse off condition than non-existence, and to make a
determination of where this threshold lies. However, despite Smajdor’s protesta-
tions, an answer can be easily found. For, although non-existence is not a state of
being and thus cannot be said to be preferable for an individual, it can be in an
individual’s interests to end her life or to have her life ended for her. If it were not,
we would not view it to be ‘better’ to painlessly end the life of a suffering animal
than to allow it to continue existing in a state that is both terrible and terrifying for
it, and neither would we seriously consider questions relating to rational suicide or
voluntary euthanasia. As Parfit notes:
A certain kind of life may be judged to be either good or bad—either worth
living or not worth living. If a certain kind of life is good, it is better than
nothing. If it is bad, it is worse than nothing…. Consider someone dying
painfully who has already made his farewells. This person may decide that
lingering on would be worse than dying. To make this judgement, he need not
compare what it would be like to linger on with what it would be like to have
died … he might consider what lay before him, and decide whether he did or
did not want to undergo it. [10, p. 487]
With this in mind, it is held that for existing individuals, the question of what
constitutes a less than worthwhile life can only be answered subjectively, for in such
cases we ask it in regards to ‘individuals who can have a view about the desirability
of their own existence’. In this sense, ‘a condition is worse than non-existence if and
only if the subject would rather not exist than exist in such a condition’ [7, p. 93].
Where the threshold lies for conception to be considered wrongful is trickier to
determine, however. For in such cases, we cannot ask the child to be created
whether he would consider his life worth living, and nor may we appeal to the
4 Note that in cases where the decision to bring to birth lives that are highly likely to be less than worth
living for reasons other than the child’s own limitations, such as for reasons of social justice, there may be
other proper subjects of blame than the mother. Consider, for example, the choice to bring to birth a black
child in a highly racist society or a case in which an individual would have a life that is worth living but
for the denial of the resources that should, in accordance with one’s particular theory of justice, be
provided to him.
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conditions under which we would consider our own lives to be less than worth
living. Instead, we must attempt to determine, in light of the information available
to us, whether the child to be created is likely to consider his life to be worth having,
and this is to be done by assessing ‘whether or not such a life has a favourable
balance of satisfactions over miseries’ [7, p. 93].
If we turn, then, to Smajdor’s concerns regarding whether existence can
constitute a predicate, we can note that it is not at all clear how such considerations
bear on the question of harmful conceptions and wrongful lives on threshold
accounts. For on such accounts, whether we do or do not choose to bring to birth a
child with a harmful genetic constitution has little bearing on the properties with
which he would enter the world. To be sure, non-existent things lack all properties,
as existence is a precursor for having properties, and thus, to state that a child can be
harmed or benefited by not being brought into existence is nonsensical; however,
existent things can, on non-comparative accounts of harm, possess as a necessary
property the property of harm itself. For example, we can note that in the congenital
syphilis case, whether or not the mother decides to birth the child/children she could
have before the cure, it will be deemed that his/their necessary properties are
harmful as such properties result in suffering. The harm is inherent in that child’s
necessary properties, and thus, the concept of the child with congenital syphilis
already contains harm, which is not altered in the least bit by our choice of whether
or not to bring him to birth or by whether we view existence to constitute a
predicate.
Indeed, the corollary on such accounts seems to confirm this: for, non-
comparative accounts such as Harris’s also hold that if an effective treatment were
discovered after the child’s birth it is the harm that the child experiences which
provides the motive for administering the treatment. If the child were not in a
harmed condition, if the condition is not harmful, then why attempt to treat the
congenital syphilis or seek to discover a cure?
The same, incidentally, goes for understanding the moral imperatives engaged by
the possibility of human enhancement, the possibility of improving on normal
species functioning or species typical functioning. The moral motive for human
enhancement is generated by the possibility of ameliorating the human condition, of
seeing the harmfulness of things as they are, the imperfections of human nature. If
there is such a thing as human nature, this ‘fact’ does not prevent us from seeing its
limitations and harmful effects, even when we have no different extant states of
being with which to compare. The possibility of enhancing evolution, of improving
on human nature, seems, on such accounts, to create a new conception of what it is
to be in a harmed condition, not relative to existing alternative states, but to possible
enhancements [21, pp. 86-109].
Conclusion
We have considered a number of arguments forwarded by Anna Smajdor in her
article ‘How Useful is the Concept of the ‘‘Harm Threshold’’ in Reproductive Ethics
and Law?’ where she sought to uncover a number of problems inherent in the
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concept of the harm threshold by appealing to Kantian arguments concerning the
question of whether existence can constitute a predicate. After exploring and
explaining Smajdor’s arguments, we acknowledged that the question of whether
existence can constitute a predicate is relevant for questions of the ethics of
reproductive decision making on comparative accounts of harm, and thus, that the
concept of the harm threshold lies on shaky ground on such accounts. However,
while such is the case, we have also shown that Smajdor’s characterisation of
Parfit’s position on the possibility of threshold harms in non-identity cases rests on a
mistake and that the arguments to which Smajdor appeals do not seem to apply on
non-comparative accounts of harm, which, incidentally, tend to be the accounts of
harm to which those who actually appeal to the concept of a harm threshold
subscribe.
Smajdor, therefore, fails to provide compelling reasons for those who subscribe
to non-comparative accounts to abandon their claim that in cases of lives less than
worth living, persons can be both harmed and wronged by being brought into
existence. With this in mind, we suggest that should Smajdor wish to continue her
work in this area, she must try to engage more fully with non-comparative accounts
of harm and provide arguments giving those who subscribe to such accounts reasons
to abandon their view. For, if she believes, as her article seems to suggest, that we
may only appeal to comparative harms when making ethical and legal decisions,
such a position cannot be defended along the lines she proposes.
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